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ABSTRACT

OR BEST OFFER: A PRIVACY POLICY NEGOTIATION PROTOCOL

Daniel D. Walker IV
Department of Computer Science
Master of Science

Users today are concerned about how their information is collected, stored and used
by Internet sites. Privacy policy languages, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), allow websites to publish their privacy practices and policies in machine
readable form. Currently, software agents designed to protect users’ privacy follow a
“take it or leave it” approach when evaluating these privacy policies. This approach
is inflexible and gives the server ultimate control over the privacy of web transactions.
Privacy policy negotiation is one approach to leveling the playing field by allowing
a client to negotiate with a server to determine how that server collects and uses
the client’s data. We present a privacy policy negotiation protocol, “Or Best Offer”, that includes a formal model for specifying privacy preferences and reasoning
about privacy policies. The protocol is guaranteed to terminate within three rounds
of negotiation while producing policies that are Pareto-optimal, and thus fair to both
parties. That is, it remains fair to both the client and the server.
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Chapter 1 — Introduction

Reports of identity theft and the loss and misuse of personal information fuel increased
privacy concerns for many Internet users, who worry about the personal information
that websites collect. To help alleviate these concerns, many websites publicize their
privacy practices.
One way that privacy policies may be published is through the use of the Platform
for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [23], an XML language designed to specify sites intend
to handle information they collect about visitors to their site. Usually, a site publishes
its P3P policy in a well-known location on its server. When a client visits the site,
a software agent acting on the user’s behalf examines the policy and compares it to
the preferences the user has configured to express how her data is to be used. If
the policy meets the client’s preferences, the software agent approves the transaction,
and the user continues browsing without any noticeable interruption. If the agent
determines that the policy is incompatible with the user’s preferences, the transaction
is discontinued or limited, optionally with a message to the user explaining the nature
of the incompatibility.
This “take it or leave it” approach is static and confining given the dynamic
nature of the Internet and the flexibility of user preferences, which depend on context
and other factors. Spiekermann et al. [20] have shown that users have a variety of
goals in mind when formulating privacy preferences and that almost all are willing
to make concessions. Users seem to have an ideal set of preferences that they adhere
to when possible, and another set of “good enough” preferences that they are willing
to accept for minimal privacy protection. From the server’s perspective, although
a site may prefer to collect certain types of information and use that information
1
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in rather promiscuous ways, it may be willing to collect less information, and use
that information in more protected ways, but only if a user specifically requests such
protections.
One way to increase the flexibility of P3P is by introducing per-session privacy negotiations that are carried out by software agents according to an established protocol
[4, 14, 21]. Their purpose is to produce fine-grained privacy contracts that dictate
the contents of the privacy policy that governs the use of data revealed or collected
during a single transaction.
Before it becomes practical and effective to implement per-session privacy policy negotiations, several developments need to occur. First there must be a way to
guarantee the authenticity of the resulting policies, and to verify which parties negotiated to produce them. Second, mechanisms must be put in place to help enterprises
manage and enforce these policies. Third, some way must be found to detect policy
violations. Fourth, legal measures must exist to offer recourse when violations occur.
Finally, appropriate protocols for negotiating the terms of the privacy policies must be
formulated. This paper seeks to address only this final requirement, the formulation
of a privacy policy negotiation protocol. We assume the existence of a PKI infrastructure as a central part of the protocol to provide the needed authenticity. The
problems of developing enforcement mechanisms, violation detection techniques, and
the appropriate legal constructs, though important prerequisites for the deployment
of the protocol, are beyond the scope of this work.
Other privacy policy negotiation protocols have been developed [4, 14, 21]. There
are two limitations present in this earlier work that our research seeks to address.
First, earlier specifications allow negotiating parties to engage in potentially endless
exchanges of proposals and counter-proposals. Second, negotiating agents in these
systems cannot determine whether the concessions they make increase or decrease
2

the chances of a successful negotiation. The goal of this research is a protocol design
specification that overcomes these limitations while remaining secure and fair to both
parties.
Our contributions include the following: a privacy policy negotiation protocol that
terminates within a finite number of rounds, a set of preference models that allow for
the specification of privacy preferences in a graphical and fairly intuitive fashion, and
the application of game theory to specify reasonable utility functions that allow us
to show that the protocol is Pareto-optimal, and thus fair to both parties.
The protocol is based on an “Or Best Offer” (OBO) style of negotiation, similar
to sellers who advertise an item for a fixed price and then express a willingness
to entertain a “best offer” in order to learn what buyers might be willing to pay.
The protocol enables per-session privacy contract negotiations that are guaranteed
to terminate within a maximum of three negotiation rounds. The server makes a
proposal, the client makes a counter proposal and also gives hints about how the
server can best satisfy her needs. Finally, the server does its best to conform to the
clients preferences, while at the same time meeting its own needs.
The remainder of this document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces
related work. Chapter 3 gives a high level explanation of the protocol along with definitions of each message type used and a specification for when each message is sent.
Chapter 4 introduces a running example that will be referenced to explain various
concepts throughout the remainder of the document . Chapter 5 defines the policy
model used in OBO. In Chapter 6 the problem of reasoning about privacy policies is
addressed through the introduction of preference models and utility functions used
by agents conducting OBO negotiations. The negotiation strategy employed by negotiating agents is given in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 evaluates how well OBO meets its
goals, including a proof showing the Pareto-optimality of OBO negotiations. Finally,
3
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Chapter 9 contains conclusions and future work.
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Chapter 2 — Related Work

The idea of negotiating per-session privacy policies was considered for inclusion in the
P3P specification. The idea was rejected, however, when the platform’s designers were
unable to envision scenarios in which this capability would be useful [5]. Since then,
there have been two proposals for per-session privacy policy negotiation protocols.
The first such proposal was made by Bennicke and Langendorfer [4]. In their
protocol, a negotiation is a process by which a privacy contract is proposed and
then incrementally modified to meet the demands of both parties. Negotiators have
demands that can either be mandatory or optional. The goal of a negotiating party is
to have all of its own mandatory demands met and as many of its optional demands
met as possible by the final contract. Each party alternatively assumes the roles,
proposal maker and acceptor. The proposal maker proposes a contract that meets
at least its own mandatory demands, and the accepter can then respond in one
of several ways to refine the policy until both parties agree to accept it. In order
to enable negotiations, Bennicke and Langendorfer introduce modifications to the
P3P and APPEL (a rule-based P3P preference exchange language) specifications. A
later paper, by Langendorfer and Maaser[14], includes a more detailed description of
the algorithms used to resolve conflicting APPEL messages caused by multiple rule
matches on the same policy.
The second negotiation protocol is the Privacy Server Protocol Project (PSP) [21],
which is designed to allow clients and servers to produce “mutual” privacy contracts.
These contracts are mutual in the sense that they are considered binding on both the
server and the client, instead of applying just to the server, as is usually the case.
The assumption is that both parties may reveal sensitive data, and the client should
5
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therefore agree to respect the server’s privacy also. Despite its bilateral nature, PSP is
very similar to the Bennicke-Langendorfer proposal, in that the protocol requires the
client and server to exchange proposals and counter-proposals until one side finally
agrees to the last proposal made by the other. It also uses a rule-based preference
model based on APPEL.
One limitation of these privacy policy negotiation protocols is the fact that they
are incomplete and could require a potentially infinite number of rounds. Moreover,
these methods do not have models in place to inform negotiating agents as to how
policy terms rank with regards to preference, so they may make concessions that are
actually counter-productive to the negotiation.

6
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The goals of OBO are to be complete, fair, and secure. A protocol is complete if
it always terminates in a successful or unsuccessful outcome. OBO is complete by
definition and only admits three rounds of negation. A protocol is fair if it does
not favor one party over the other. OBO is fair, and we prove its fairness using
Pareto-optimality from game theory in Section 8.0.2. Pareto-optimality is the notion
that no other solution exists that can better benefit either party participating in the
game. In other words, in a successful negotiation, neither the client nor the server
can better meet their own needs without causing the policy to be rejected by one or
the other. A protocol is secure when it protects the negotiating parties or a third
party from manipulating the negotiation process. OBO is secure assuming adequate
legislation, PKI, etc. as discussed in the introduction. A full analysis of OBO security
is contained in Section 8.0.2.
3.1

Overview
An OBO negotiation consists of three rounds. During each round, one party in

the negotiation makes a proposal and the other makes a decision to accept or reject
that proposal. The first proposal is issued by the server, in the form of its default
privacy policy. This policy details all of the ways in which the server needs to use
the client’s data to fulfill its purpose, along with other uses that the server might
put the data to in order to potentially increase revenue or provide a more customized
experience to the user. The client may accept this policy, or issue a counter proposal
to the server. This counter proposal will remove any of the portions of the policy
that the client does not feel completely comfortable with. With the counter-proposal,
the client is effectively telling the server: “Give me this much privacy, or make me
7
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P roposalj =P roposal{P olj , t stamp, IDc , IDs [, Preferences],
sign(P olj , t stamp, IDc , IDs [, Preferences])}
Acceptj =Accept{t stamp, sign(P roposalj , t stamp)}
Reject =Reject{}

Figure 3.1: OBO negotiation messages. Here, sign(X) is a digital signature over X.

your best offer.” Because privacy means different things to different individuals, the
client must help the server understand which offers it might formulate are “better”
for this particular client. To accomplish this, the client sends information about its
preferences to the server, along with its counter-proposal. The server can either accept
the client’s counter-offer, or it may use the information about the client’s preferences
to formulate the final “best offer” proposal. If the client rejects the final proposal,
then the negotiation fails. If at any point during the negotiation one of the parties
accepts a proposal, then the negotiation succeeds and terminates.
Negotiations are carried out piecewise over distinct portions of the policy referred
to as terms. In fact, an OBO policy negotiation can be thought of as a set of simultaneous term-level negotiations carried out in parallel. If all term-level negotiations
succeed, the results are combined to produce a complete privacy policy contract. If
any of the the negotiations fail, the overall negotiation fails to produce a consensus
policy.

3.2

Message Definitions
There are three types of messages in the OBO protocol (see Figure 3.1).
8
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P roposal

The proposal message for round j (P roposalj ) contains the proposal policy

(P olj ), which consists of all of the terms still under negotiation, as well as any that
have been accepted. The message also contains a timestamp representing the date
and time the message was created, and tokens that uniquely identify the client and
server (IDc and IDs , respectively). This message can optionally contain a set of
preferences (Preferences). A preference set consists of graphs specified by the client
that provide the server with an indication of what types of terms the user considers to
be less desireable. These preferences are only present in the second round proposal,
P roposal2 .
Accept An accept message for round j is used to indicate that all of the terms of
P roposalj have been accepted and the negotiation should terminate. The contents
of this message constitute the privacy contract between the client and server. Accept
messages are approval tokens that indicate in an authentic and non-repudiable way
the acceptance of the last proposal policy. This token consists of a digital signature
over the contents of P roposalj along with a time stamp t stamp.
Reject The Reject message indicates that the current negotiation has failed. This
message is only sent by the client, and only at the end of the third round if the client
does not accept any of the terms in the server’s final proposal.
3.3

Message Flow
The rounds of an OBO negotiation proceed as follows.

Round 1 The client initiates the first round by connecting to the server and requesting the server’s privacy policy. The server replies by sending the default policy,
P1 , in the message P roposal1 . If the client accepts the default policy, it sends Accept1 ,
otherwise, Round 2 begins.
9
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Round 2 If the client rejects any of the terms in the server’s default policy from
Round 1, then the client begins the second round of negotiation by sending the
message P roposal2 , including the client’s preference set. If the server decides to
accept the policy proposal, then it sends Accept2 .
Round 3 If the server rejects the client’s counter-offer, it has one more chance for
the negotiation to succeed. The server uses the client’s preference set, and its own
preferences, to create the best-offer policy, P3 , which is sent in the message P roposal3 .
If the policy is acceptable, the client sends Accept3 . If the client does not approve of
the final offer, then it sends a Reject message.

10
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Throughout the remainder of this paper, we present a running example of an OBO
negotiation between a client (Alice) and an online merchant (Bob). The negotiation
reconciles Alice’s privacy preferences with Bob’s data collection. Bob obtains revenue
through selling goods, as well as occasionally offering information about his customers
to “partners”. In addition, if Alice consents, Bob can use information about Alice
to customize her experience at the site, and occasionally makes parts of her profile
available for others to view.
Once the preference model is formally specified, the running example shows how
Alice and Bob specify their privacy preferences. Then, a three round negotiation
example is given where Alice negotiates a contract with Bob for how he will handle
her information such as her physical address, purchase information, and financial
data.

11
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Chapter 5 — Policies

Privacy policies are composed of the atomic constituents data elements and practice
tags. A data element is a reference to a single specific piece of information about
an individual (e.g., a telephone number). Data elements are organized hierarchically
into data categories and data sets, which can be used to refer to groups of data
elements. In this work, we make use of the elements and categories defined by the
W3C, as they are considered industry standards. For example, the data category
“physical,” as defined by the W3C, contains all of the data elements that would allow
someone to contact or locate an individual in the physical world. Here, we also define
a set AllData, which contains every data element that applies to an individual. It is
important to note that actual data about individuals does not occur inside of privacy
policies, only labels that refer to pieces of information that the site may collect. For
example, the policy may contain the token “telephone”, but never an actual client
telephone number.
In addition to declaring the types of data that they collect, entities must also be
able to specify how they will treat that data. To do this, privacy policies associate
practice tags with data elements. There are three types of practice tags: recipients,
retention, and purpose. Recipients tags specify the parties that will have access to
the data, retention tags specify how long the data will be stored, and purpose tags
specify the ways in which the data will be used. Three disjoint sets, RecipientT ags,
RetentionT ags, and P urposeT ags are defined that contain all supported recipients,
retention and purpose tags, respectively. In this work we populate these sets with the
tags based on those found in the P3P specification [23].
A privacy policy combines these atomic constituents as a collection of terms,
13
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organized into statements. In order to formulate privacy policies and preferences, it
is often necessary to refer to the individual terms of a policy. These terms can be
expressed in different ways. Using natural language, for example, one might formulate
the following term: “we share your address with our shipping partners.” Terms can
also be expressed as formalized constructs in a machine readable format using P3P.
Formally, a policy is a set of statements, that is P = {S1 , ..., Sn }, where each Si
is a tuple of the form Si = (Di , Reci , Reti , P uri ), where Di ⊆ AllData, Reci ⊆
{RecipientT ags}, Reti ⊆ {RetentionT ags}, and P uri ⊆ {P urposeT ags}.
The statements of a policy can further be decomposed into terms, each of which is
a tuple TiX = (Di , Xi ), where Di is the set of data items specified in Si and X indicates
the term type and is one of: Rec, Ret, or P ur, with Xi being the set of the appropriate
type, also from Si . This means that each statement consists of three terms, one
for each type. Figure 5.1 shows how an example policy term might be represented
formally. In this example, the P3P practice tags “ours”, “delivery”, “same”, “others”,
and “public” are applied to the named set of data elements “physical”, in order to
provide the same semantics as the natural language statement. The P3P specification
details the meaning of each tag [23].
Each OBO policy negotiation can be thought of as a set of synchronized concurrent
negotiations, one for every term in the policy. This is because different sets of data
elements have distinct preferences applied to them, and because it is impractical to
directly compare the utility of practice tags of different types. The decisions and
proposals made during the negotiation of one term in the policy do not affect the
others. Therefore, the remaining discussion on policies will focus on how to analyze
and interpret individual terms. In order to simplify the presentation here and without
loss of generality, we will assume that all the terms given in the remainder of this
paper refer to the same data set and are of the same data type. Using this assumption,
14

English: “We share your address with shipping partners who will use it to carry out
delivery and may use it in other ways as well. Your address may also be shared
with other organizations, who’s privacy policies are known to us, though they
may be different than our own. It may also be shared with other site visitors,
when appropriate.”
Formal Term:
T Rec = (physical, { ours, delivery, same, others, public})

Figure 5.1: A term from Bob’s default policy.
we will treat references to T = TiX = (Di , Xi ) as references to Xi .

15
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Chapter 6 — Preferences

Agents must be able to reason about the relative quality of the terms that will be
evaluated during a negotiation. To this end preference models are defined to encode
the unique needs and preferences of individual clients and servers. From these models,
utility functions are derived that allow for the comparison and ranking of privacy policy terms. It is important that these models and their corresponding utility functions
be defined explicitly and unambiguously, as they are central to the functioning of the
protocol and necessary in order to prove that a given solution is Pareto-optimal.
6.1

Utility Functions
A cardinal utility function is a function of the form UC (T ) → < which maps a

term to a real value, called the utility of T . In practice, it is not necessary to completely formulate such a utility function, however. The actual real-valued utilities are
inconsequential, as long as policies can be sorted. To accomplish this, ordinal utility
functions, UO (Ti , Tj ), are defined for use by the software agents. These functions
act as comparators that can be used to sort terms in non-descending utility order,
without requiring the cardinal utility values. Ordinal utility functions can be easier
to define, because only proportionality, and not magnitude is required.
Definition 1. UO is an ordinal utility function if ∀Ti , Tj :




0
if UC (Ti ) = UC (Tj )




UO (Ti , Tj ) = 1
if UC (Ti ) > UC (Tj )






−1 if UC (Ti ) < UC (Tj )
Because the number of terms that can be created with a finite set of tags is also
finite, it must be the case that there is at least one term that has utility greater than
17
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or equal to all other terms. The value of UC for this term is the upper bound on the
range for that function and is called MAX U . The exact real value of MAX U is
unimportant, as the term T for which UC (T ) = MAX U can be found using UO .
Finally, for the purpose of conducting negotiations, each party must choose a
threshold utility value FAILURE U that determines the point at which that party
would rather have a negotiation fail than accept a term with utility below that threshold.

6.2

Client Preference Model

The formulation of client privacy preferences follows a data-centric model [25].
All data categories and (as required) data elements are assigned three separate DAGs
(directed acyclic graphs), one each for the retention, recipients and purpose tag types.
These DAGs define partial orderings over tags that can be found in policy terms, with
each tag occupying a node in the graph. For example, the recipients graph, GRec ,
gives a partial ordering over all tags in RecipientT ags.
In this ordering, for tags X and Y , X ≺G Y if there is a non-empty path in the
graph from X to Y . Also, X G Y indicates that either X = Y (they are the same
tag) or X ≺G Y . We say that, X and Y are independent if neither X G Y nor
Y G X. In general we say that the preferability of a node is inversely related to this
ordering, so that if X ≺G Y , then the client prefers tag X to tag Y .
Once graphs have been assigned to data elements, two sets of nodes, A and C, in
each graph are selected as acceptable and unacceptable cutoff frontiers, respectively.
These frontiers must partition the graph’s set of nodes, N , into three disjoint sub-sets:
18
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Ideal , Acc, and Unacc, which are defined as shown here:
Ideal = {n ∈ N | ∃a ∈ A : n ≺G a}
Acc = {n ∈ N | ∃a ∈ A, c ∈ C : a G n G c}
Unacc = {n ∈ N | ∃c ∈ C : c ≺G n}
These sets contain tags that the client considers to be ideal, acceptable and unacceptable, respectively. Ideal tags are those that the user “doesn’t mind,” that is, they
have no negative impact on the utility of the policy as far as the client is concerned.
Acceptable tags are those which the user would prefer not be included in the policy,
but that are tolerable if unavoidable. Unacceptable tags are deal breakers. By placing
a tag in this set, the client conveys that a negotiation should fail before the agent
accepts a policy containing that tag. Users must be solicited for information about
their tolerances in order to determine which of these sets each tag should belong to.
This could be done in a guided fashion, with the system using the preference DAGs
to selectively query the user about individual tag memberships until the borders are
determined. Another approach would be to provide the user with some way to group
or label the nodes free form, after appropriate instruction.
Once the graphs and cutoff frontiers are defined, the preferences for each data
element Di are expressed by the tuple:
Rec
P ur
Ret
Rec
Rec
(Di , GRet
, ARet
, APi ur , CiP ur ), where the GX ’s are the prefi , Gi , Gi
i , Ci , Ai , Ci

erence DAGs, and the AX ’s and C X ’s are the acceptable and unacceptable cutoff
frontiers (respectively) for each graph. Sets of data elements can be grouped together
under the same set of preferences as desired.
From the specification of the client’s preference model, it is possible to derive a
utility function over terms for the client. Again, we assume that all terms and graphs
refer to the same data sets and are of the same type. First, we define the concept of
the least-preferred nodes in a set of tags.
19
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Definition 2. Given a preference graph G and a term, T , the least-preferred nodes
in T are those in the set
L(T, G) = {x | x ∈ T ∧ ∀y ∈ T, x ⊀G y}
In general, we say that the utility of the term as a whole is determined by the least
preferable tags contained in that term, and is inversely proportional to the ordering
over tags defined in the client’s preference graph, G. This means that for tags M and
N , if M ≺G N , and term TM contains tag M but not tag N and L(TM , G) = {M },
TN contains tag N but not tag M and L(TN , G) = {N } and TM N contains both M
and N and L(TM N , G) = {N }, then UC (TN ) ≤ UC (TM ) and UC (TN ) = UC (TM N ). In
addition, the following constraints apply:
1. If M ∈ Ideal , then UC (TM ) = MAX U
2. If M ∈ Unacc, then UC (TM ) < FAILURE U
3. If M, N ∈ Acc and M ≺G N then UC (TM ) > UC (TN )
4. If M, N ∈ Acc and M = N , then UC (TM ) = UC (TN )
5. If M, N ∈ Acc and M and N are independent (X G Y ∧ Y G X), then
UC (TM ) = UC (TN )
Given these constraints on UC , we may now define the client’s ordinal utility
function over terms. This function formalizes the constraints listed above, generalizing
them to apply to the case where nodes M and N are replaced with arbitrary sets of
least-preferred nodes. Recall that Ideal , Acc, and Unacc form a mutually exclusive
partition on the term.

20
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Definition 3. The client’s ordinal utility function over terms with respect to graph
G is:

UO (Ti , Tj ) =





0





























if (Li ⊆ Ideal ∧ Lj ⊆ Ideal )∨
(| Fj |=| Fi | ∧ | Lj |=| Li |)∨
(Li ∩ Unacc 6= ∅ ∧ Lj ∩ Unacc 6= ∅)

1
if (Li ∩ Unacc = ∅ ∧ Lj ∩ Unacc 6= ∅)∨







(Li ∩ Acc 6= ∅ ∧ Lj ∩ Acc 6= ∅∧








(| Fj |>| Fi | ∨ | Lj |>| Li |))















−1 if UO (Tj , Ti ) = 1

where Ti and Tj are the terms to be compared and Li = {t | t ∈ L(Ti , G)},
Fi = {t | t ∈ Li ∧ ∃u ∈ Lj s.t. u ≺G t}, and Lj and Fj are defined similarly for Tj .
In other words, two terms have equivalent utility if all of their least-preferred
nodes are in Ideal . If both terms have a least-preferred node in Unacc, or if both
least-preferred tag sets contain the same number of tags that are less preferred than
least-preferred tags in the other, and both least-preferred sets are the same size. A
term that does not have any of its least-preferred nodes in Unacc has greater utility
than one that does. A term that has all of its least preferred nodes in Ideal has
greater utility than one that does not. Also, if both sets have least-preferred tags in
Acc, then the one that has the most least-preferred tags that are less preferred than
the other term’s, or has fewer least-preferred tags in general, has less utility than the
other.
Based on this function, it is possible to identify terms with maximal utility, and
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those that have utility less than FAILURE U .
Definition 4. The maximal utility term for the client is any term, T , that contains
only ideal tags:
UC (T ) = MAX U ⇐⇒ T ⊆ Ideal .
Definition 5. A client would rather a negotiation fail than accept any term T that
contains an unacceptable tag:
UC (T ) < FAILURE U ⇐⇒ T ∩ Unacc 6= ∅.
6.2.1

Alice’s Preferences

At some point, Alice has defined preference graphs to safeguard her personal
data. Alice might have composed these graphs herself using a software tool. Another
possibility is that she selected these graphs from some pre-packaged source, or had
them provided as part of a security suite. Figure 6.1 shows one of these graphs that
gives an ordering over recipient tags. Many possible configurations exist for each
graph type. Alice might choose only one graph of each type for all her data, or apply
different graphs to different data groups.
Alice groups her data as follows:
D1 (sensitive data) = {physical, purchase, f inancial}
D2 (less sensitive data) = {e | e ∈ AllData ∧ e ∈
/ D1 }
These sets contain labels of data elements, or categories of elements. No actual user
data is included in these sets. Each group is assigned a set of preferences. This
means, for example, that if a privacy policy statement mentions any of the categories
(e.g. physical), or members of the categories (e.g., address) in D1 , a certain set of
preferences needs to be applied to that statement. In an actual configuration, each
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Figure 6.1: Alice’s recipients preference graph, with A and C cutoff frontiers.

group is assigned a retention, recipients and purpose graph. For simplicity, in this
example we only specify that Group D1 is assigned the recipients graph shown in
Figure 6.1. The cutoff nodes for this graph are A = {same, delivery} and C =
{others}. These cutoff nodes indicate that Alice has no problem with the server
sharing her sensitive data with organizations that only use it for fulfilling her requests
(ours), but is hesitant about the server sharing it with other organizations that might
use it in other ways (same, delivery, others). Alice also does not want her sensitive
information shared with the public or with organizations that have unknown privacy
policies (unrelated).
6.3

Server Preference Model
The server side preference model is much simpler, this is the result of several

factors. First, clients use the web for many distinct purposes, from shopping to
web-mail to research. In contrast to clients, servers execute a relatively limited set
of functions, all of which are governed by a given purpose or business model. The
server preferences, therefore, are much more static then client preferences and are
determined by the function of the server and the business requirements for the site
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collecting data from visitors. Also, since the object of the negotiation is the personal
data of the clients, of which there are many, the client’s preference model naturally
needs more granularity and flexibility than the servers. This being the case, the server
model groups preferences into just 2 categories:

1. Req - Because of technical or business model constraints, these terms must be
in the final policy or the negotiation will fail.

2. Pref - These terms should be included in the final policy if possible, but if they
cannot be, negotiation can still succeed.

We call members of Req required and members of Pref preferred.
Each of these categories is a set of pairs of the form Category = {K1 , ...Km }
where each Ki is a pair of the form (Di , ti ) where Di is a set of data elements and ti
is a preference tag. Again, to simplify notation, we assume in what follows that all
references to these categories refer to a single term and the data set D and are all of
the same type X. Therefore, we treat references to Category as though it where the
set of tags: {t | ∃K = (D, t) ∧ K ∈ Category}.
The server’s utility function is much simpler than the client’s. First, the server
may not accept any term which does not contain all of its required tags. Also, for any
term T which contains all of the server’s required tags, UC (T ) is proportional to the
number of preferred tags contained in the term. These constraints make it possible
to fully specify the server’s ordinal utility function over terms.
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Definition 6. The ordinal
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utility function over terms for the server is:
if (| Ri |=| Rj |) ∧ (| Pi |=| Pj |)

if (| Ri |>| Rj |) ∨ ((| Ri |=| Rj |) ∧ (| Pi |>| Pj |))

if UO (Tj , Ti ) = 1

where Ti and Tj are the terms to be compared, Req and Pref are the server’s preference
sets, Ri = {x | x ∈ Ti ∧ x ∈ Req}, Pi = {x | x ∈ Ti ∧ x ∈ Pref }, and Rj and Pj are
defined similarly for Tj .
That is, two terms have equivalent utility if they contain the same number of
required tags and the same number of preferred tags. If two terms have different
numbers of required tags, the term with more required tags has higher utility. Also,
if two terms contain the same number of required tags, the one with the highest
number of preferred tags has the greatest utility.
With the server utility function, the terms with maximal utility, and those that
have utility less than FAILURE U for the server can be identified.
Definition 7. The maximal utility term for the server is any term, T , that contains
all required and all preferred tags:
UC (T ) = MAX U ⇐⇒ Req ⊆ T ∧ Pref ⊆ T.
Definition 8. A server would rather a negotiation fail than accept any term T that
does not contain all required tags:
UC (T ) < FAILURE U ⇐⇒ Req * T.
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6.3.1

Bob’s Preferences

This is the portion of Bob’s preferences that relates to recipients tags as applied
to his customer’s sensitive data:
physical, purchase and financial:
Required: delivery, others
Preferred: ours, same, public
These preferences mean that Bob must be able to give Alice’s physical, purchase
and financial information, if collected, to entities that will use it for delivery and,
potentially, other purposes (delivery). He also must be allowed to share it with
companies that are accountable to him, but who may have privacy policies that he is
not familiar with (others). Bob would also like the option of sharing that data with
organizations that only use it to help fulfill any orders placed by the user (ours), and
partners having similar privacy policies (same). Finally, he would prefer having the
option to share it with other visitors, when appropriate (public).
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Agent

Agent task

Client

Accept proposal

Preference constraints

Protocol constraints

Reject policies containing None
unacceptable tags

Client

Counter-proposal Remove all unacceptable

Term should have highest

nodes

possible utility and only
contain Ideal tags

Server

Accept proposal

Only accept policies con-

None

taining all the server’s required tags
Server

“Best offer”

Ensure that the policies

Server not decrease client

contains all required tags

utility any more than nec-

and as many preferred essary for the negotiation
tags as possible

to succeed

Table 7.1: Constraints on agent behavior.

Agents are constrained in the formulation of proposal policies in that they must
follow strategies that are consistent with the preferences of the party they represent,
while at the same time fulfilling the guidelines specified by the protocol. Table 7.1
outlines these constraints. Any agent that acts within these constraints can engage
in OBO negotiations. However, not all strategies that are consistent with these constraints are guaranteed to be fair (produce Pareto-optimal policies). Here we describe
a set of rules that meet these constraints and that, when followed by both parties,
are sufficient to always produce Pareto-optimal results. This set of rules is the “OBO
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Pareto-optimal strategy”.
Rule 1 (Initial Offer Rule). The server’s initial offer term is T = Req ∪ Pref .
Rule 2 (Early Acceptance Rule). In rounds 1 and 2, a party, A, may only accept a
proposal term T from party B if UCA (T ) ≥ UCA (T 0 ), where T 0 is the counter-proposal
term that A would send to B upon rejection of T .
Rule 3 (Client Counter-proposal Rule). Given an initial proposal term T from the
server and client preference graph G, the client formulates a new term
T 0 = {t | t ∈ T ∧ t ∈ Ideal according to the A cutoff frontier for G}.
Rule 4 (Server Best-offer Rule). Given a proposal term T from the client, the server
formulates its best-offer term T 00 in two stages. First, the server inserts all of its Req
tags into the term, creating a new set T 0 = Ti ∪ Req. Next, it adds all of its preferred
tags into the set that it can, without decreasing the utility of the term for the client
by creating a new set T 00 = T 0 ∪ {t | t ∈ Pref ∧ ∃s ∈ T 0 s.t. t ≺ s}.
Rule 5 (Client Final Acceptance Rule). Given a best-offer proposal term T and client
preference graph G, the client accepts the term only if T ∩Unacc = ∅ according to the
C cutoff frontier of G and rejects otherwise.
7.1

Alice and Bob Negotiate
Based on their established preferences, Alice and Bob apply the rules of the Pareto-

optimal strategy, in the negotiation over the recipients of Alice’s address information
as follows.
In Round 1, Bob sends this term (Rule 1):
T1Rec = (D1 , { ours, delivery, same, others, public})
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Alice chooses not to accept (Rules 2 and 3), instead sending her preference graphs,
data groupings (with an indication of which graphs apply to each), and the following
policy (Rule 3):
T1Rec = (D1 , { ours})
This counter-proposal decreases the number of recipients with which Alice’s sensitive
information can be shared.
In the final round Bob does not accept Alice’s proposal (Rules 2 and 4). Instead,
he formulates the “best offer” policy shown here (Rule 4):
T1Rec = (D1 , { ours, delivery, same, others})
This term re-introduces Bob’s required tags delivery and others that were removed
by Alice. Also, the preferred term same was re-introduced because same ≺G others.
At this point, Alice accepts the policy and the negotiation succeeds (Rule 5).
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Chapter 8 — Protocol Evaluation

As discussed in Chapter 3, a viable privacy policy negotiation protocol must be complete, fair and secure. The OBO protocol is complete by definition; all negotiations
are guaranteed to terminate within the three rounds specified. This chapter shows
that the protocol is also fair and secure. Fairness is evaluated by proving that terms
resulting from a successful OBO negotiation are Pareto-optimal. The security of the
protocol is analyzed as well, using a threat model to identify potential problems in the
security of the protocol, and then presenting implementation design considerations
that could mitigate these problems.
8.0.1

Fairness Analysis

Pareto-optimality, or Pareto-efficiency is a property of some game and negotiation
end-states. It is often used as an indication that the benefits of successful negotiations
are balanced for both parties [13, 24, 19]. For a state to be Pareto-optimal, it must
be the case that there is no other state that is better for all parties in the negotiation,
or better for at least one party and not worse for all the others.
Definition 9. Given two negotiating parties P1 and P2 , a policy term T is Paretooptimal if for all other T 0 the following holds:
(UCP1 (T 0 ) = UCP1 (T )) ∧ (UCP2 (T 0 ) = UCP2 (T ))∨
((UCP1 (T 0 ) < UCP1 (T )) ∨ (UCP2 (T 0 ) < UCP2 (T ))).
Recall that the cardinal utility function, UC , for a negotiating party is implicitly
defined by a corresponding ordinal utility function, UO , that effectively orders any
two related terms in a negotiation (see Definition 1). A Pareto-optimal term is thus
a term for which all other related terms are less desirable for one negotiating party
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or have the same utility for both negotiating parties according to their respectively
defined ordinal utility functions.
As usual, all terms referred to here are assumed to be related, meaning they are
defined on a common data set and tag type. This means that we can treat references
to T = TiX = (Di , Xi ) as references to Xi . To enhance readability, we therefore
refrain from writing out the entire contents of each term, and allow their constituent
tag sets to stand in for the term itself in the discussion that follows. We are now
ready to state the main theorem of the paper:
Theorem 1. If the parties in an OBO negotiation both follow the OBO Paretooptimal strategy defined in Chapter 7, then a successful negotiation always produces
a Pareto-optimal term.
Proof. There are three cases in which an OBO negotiation may succeed. Let T
be a term produced by a successful negotiation and G be the corresponding client
preference graph partitioned appropriately. We show that, in each of these cases,
T is Pareto-optimal. We distinguish client and server utility functions by adding
superscripts of C and S respectively.
1. Client Accepts Server’s Initial Offer
The term has maximal utility for the client and the server because the initial
offer contains only ideal tags for the client and all of the required and preferred
tags for the server (see Rules 1, 2, 3, and Definitions 4 and 7). Because both
parties are at maximal utility, T is Pareto-optimal.
2. Server Accepts Client’s Counter-Offer
Assume for contradiction that T is not Pareto-optimal. By Rules 2 and 3, the
counter offer contains strictly fewer tags than the initial offer and all of the tags
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in the counter offer are ideal for the client. This means that UCC (T ) = MAX U .
If T is not Pareto-optimal, then
∃t : UCC (T ∪ {t}) ≥ MAX U ∧ UCS (T ∪ {t}) > UCS (T )
By Rules 2, and 4, T contains all of the server’s required tags. The only tags
that the server can add to T are therefore preferred tags removed from the initial
proposal; however, adding any removed preferred tag decreases the utility of T
for the client since these tags are not ideal (see Rule 3). Formally:
∀t ∈ Pref \ T, t 6∈ Ideal ∧ UCS (T ∪ {t}) >
UCS (T ) ∧ UCC (T ∪ {t}) < MAX U
This contradicts the assumption that T is not Pareto-optimal, since there is no
tag that we can add to T that maintains the utility of the term for the client
and increases the utility of the term for the server.
3. Client Accepts Server’s Best Offer
Again, for contradiction assume that T is not Pareto-optimal, meaning that
either:
∃t : UCC (T \ {t}) > UCC (T ) ∧ UCS (T \ {t}) ≥ UCS (T )
or
∃t : UCC (T ∪ {t}) ≥ UCC (T ) ∧ UCS (T ∪ {t}) > UCS (T )
We will examine these statements in order.
First, we know that there is some tag in both T and Acc such that
UCC (T \ {t}) > UCC (T )
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(by Definition 3), because otherwise the server would not have required an
additional round by Rules 2 and 4. However, by Definition 3,
∀t ∈ T, UCS (T \ {t}) < UCS (T )
meaning that the first statement is false.
Next, we also know from Rule 4 that T already contains all of the server’s
required tags, and all of the preferred tags that it could add without decreasing
the utility for the client below that of the term T 0 = Req. So, any tag that the
server could add to increase its own utility is either less preferred for the client
than some tag already in the least-preferred set of T or it increases the size of
the set of least-preferred tags. This means that
∀t ∈ Pref \ T, UCS (T ∪ {t}) > UCS (T ) ∧
UCC (T ∪ {t}) < UCC (T )
by Definition 3, making the second statement false.
The fact that both statements are false contradicts the assumption that T is
not Pareto-optimal.

8.0.2

Security Analysis

Each side in an OBO negotiation must keep certain information secret, so that the
other cannot act in ways that are inconsistent with the intentions of the protocol. For
the client, this means hiding the A and C node sets for each graph from the server.
Conversely, the client should also not be able to ascertain whether each tag in a term
is required or preferred from the server’s point of view.
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If the server knows the set C for a given graph, it can add as many of its preferred
tags as it would like, up to and including the members of C, meaning that it has no
reason to make an effort to meet the client’s preferences as closely as possible.
The most obvious threat to either client or server is that of a probing attack,
which can only be carried out if one party is able to convince the other party to
engage in multiple instances of OBO negotiations. The attacker tries to determine
the other side’s secrets by carefully formulating its various proposals. For example,
to discover the cutoff frontier C of a given client, a server might include in its best
offer proposal only one tag that is least preferred according to the client’s preference
graph. If this offer is refused, the server knows that that tag is definitely a member of
the unacceptable set of tags. The next time the client attempts to connect, the server
picks a node that is the direct ancestor of the least preferred tag. In this fashion,
the server ascertains, over a relatively small number of negotiations, every member of
the unacceptable set and thus can know exactly what the user’s cutoff nodes are for
that graph. The fact that the client has an ordered graph, detailing the preference
gradient, means that the server-side probing attack can be much more effective than
it would be if the server had to use a brute-force technique to deduce C.
The risk of probing can be mitigated in implementations of the OBO protocol,
however. For example, clients can keep a cache of negotiated privacy policies, indexed
by the identity of the sites with which they were negotiated. Then, when visiting
a site with which the client already has a relationship, it can refuse to engage in
additional negotiations, insisting instead that the previously negotiated policy be
used. This sort of caching system must be carefully implemented, however, as website
data collection requirements may change over time as enterprise policies change, or as
the relationship between the client and the enterprise changes. For example, corporate
mergers may require websites to adopt new data collection and use policies. Also, a
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user who has habitually visited an online commerce site without making purchases
might need to accept the fact that the privacy contract between herself and the site
must change in the event that she decides to actually buy something. This is because
the relationship between herself and the site has changed and the site must now collect
more information about her and share that information with other entities, such as
a shipping company.
On the server side, probing attacks are harder to defend against for two reasons.
First, the number of clients that connect to a given server can be much greater than
the number of servers that any one client connects to. In addition, while many
servers have distinct domain names and certificates issued by trusted third-parties
to authenticate their identity, individual clients have no such unique identification
mechanism, as clients can share or create new credentials. However, the ease with
which probing attacks can be carried out against servers is offset by the relatively
small gains that such attacks yield. The preferences of the server are already mostly
public, as they will almost always be expressed in the natural language privacy policy
of the server.
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The Or Best Offer privacy policy negotiation protocol is complete, fair and secure.
Its formal underpinnings provide properties not found in prior negotiation protocols.
The protocol is backwards-compatible with current P3P negotiation approaches.
A significant contribution of this work is the novel graphical model for expressing
client privacy preferences and utility functions, derived from preference models, that
allow for the comparison of policy terms. In addition, the definition of utility functions
allows for the application of game theoretical concepts to analyze the properties of
the protocol, such as the proof of Pareto-optimality in Chapter 8. This formalism
allows conjecture about alternative negotiation strategies and algorithms for clients
and servers. As new strategies are envisioned, fairly simple analysis using concepts
such as Pareto-optimality and Nash equilibrium would yield an understanding of their
potential performance.
One interesting point of the protocol is that the messages in the first round can be
replaced with a more standard privacy policy exchange procedure, like that used in
P3P today. This would allow for the gradual deployment of OBO capable agents on
the Internet, as OBO enabled agents can seamlessly interact with clients and servers
that do not support OBO negotiations. Clients and servers that do not support
OBO negotiations would not be able to distinguish OBO-enabled agents from any
other entities. OBO-enabled servers could indicate their negotiation capabilities by
embedding meta-data in their default policies.
The graphical model has the potential to offer an improvement over rule-based
preference models in terms of usability, as graphical user interfaces could allow users
or administrators to edit such models without any prior knowledge of the privacy
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policy language syntax. A prototype implementation of such an interface can be
built to evaluate the hypothesized improvement in usability.
An important area for future work is to increase the expressiveness of the client
preference model. The current model is less expressive than a rule based system, for
example. It precludes the ability to express higher-ordered preferences that involve
complex interactions between tags of different types. For example, using a rule-based
system it would be possible to express the preference “It is never acceptable for my
address to be stored indefinitely, unless the collecting enterprise never shares it or
sells it to anyone else.” In the current OBO client preference model, this type of
preference cannot be expressed.
Future work might also focus on producing a richer preference model for the
server, which would permit the specification of more complex preferences, in which
combinations of tags in conjunctions and disjunctions could be specified together
as being required or preferred. To accomplish this, the server could send a list of
alternative policies representing its best offer, one for each grouping in a disjunction.
The client could select the alternative that it prefers most and respond with an
acceptance message for the chosen alternative.
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